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Faults Affecting Energy Harvesting Circuits of 
Self-Powered Wireless Sensors and Their Possible 
 Concurrent Detection  
 
M. Omaña, D. Rossi, D. Giaffreda, R. Specchia, C. Metra, M. Marzencki, B. Kaminska 
Abstract— We analyze the effects of faults affecting an energy harvesting circuit providing power to a wireless biomedical 
multisensor node. We show that such faults may prevent the energy harvesting circuit from producing the power supply voltage 
level required by the multisensor node. Then, we propose a low cost (in terms of power consumption and area overhead) 
additional circuit monitoring the voltage level produced by the energy harvesting circuit continuously, and concurrently with the 
normal operation of the device. Such a monitor gives an error indication if the generated voltage falls below the minimum value 
required by the sensor node to operate correctly, thus allowing the activation of proper recovery actions to guarantee system 
fault tolerance. The proposed monitor is self-checking with respect to the internal faults that can occur during its in field 
operation, thus providing an error signal when affected by faults itself.   
Index Terms—Energy Harvesting, High Reliability, Fault Tolerance, Self-Powered Sensors. 
 
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensing systems are gaining in-
creasing interest, and their employment 
opens new possibilities in large scale, 
easy and low cost data capture. They are 
used for environmental and habitat moni-
toring, as well as for health surveillance 
[1, 2]. The main challenge in the use of 
such systems is associated with their pow-
er supply, still mainly provided by bat-
teries. Due to the often required small 
size and remote deployment of the wireless 
sensor, any servicing linked with battery 
replacement is impractical. Therefore, 
systems using ambient energy as additional 
energy source have recently gained a con-
siderable interest. They employ a circuit 
that harvests energy from the environment 
in which they are embedded to obtain the 
required energy. 
Systems exploiting Energy Harvesting 
(EH) would also feature higher reliability 
than those using a fixed battery. In fact, 
they are less likely to suffer from common 
problems of depleted energy supply, and 
therefore limited lifetime. This is of 
great importance in case of powering bio-
medical wearable sensors monitoring criti-
cal human vital parameters (e.g., breath-
ing, heart activity, etc.). For such ap-
plications, mechanical vibrations are a 
promising source of energy, due to their 
relatively high energy density and wide-
spread existence [3]. 
Although energy harvesting circuits 
(EHCs) could in principle be more reliable 
than fixed batteries, they are generally 
composed of many components (e.g., diodes, 
switching transistors, capacitors, induc-
tors, etc.) that may fail during in field 
operation, due to material degradation, 
electromagnetic interference, or other ef-
fects [4-6]. 
Up to now, multiple architectures of me-
chanical EH systems have been proposed [3, 
7, 8]. Nevertheless, to our knowledge, 
none of them has yet considered the ef-
fects of faults possibly affecting its 
components, but for the preliminary analy-
sis presented in [9]. Such an analysis has 
been performed considering an EHC imple-
mented with discrete components and ac-
counting for a reduced set of faults pos-
sibly affecting such components. 
Based on these considerations, in this 
paper we analyze in details the effects of 
faults affecting an integrated circuit 
performing energy harvesting from mechani-
cal vibrations, and powering a wireless 
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biomedical multisensor node. We assume 
that the EHC is implemented using the same 
CMOS technology as the multisensor node, 
and we analyze the effects of all possible 
faults affecting the EHC. We show that 
they may make the EHC fail to produce the 
required supply voltage level to the sen-
sor node, with consequent dramatic impact 
on reliability. 
To cope with this problem, we propose a 
low cost (in terms of area overhead and 
power consumption) circuit, whose electri-
cal structure is based on the monitor that 
we recently introduced [9]. Its purpose is 
to monitor continuously, and concurrently 
with the sensor operation, the correctness 
of the power supply voltage level provided 
by the EHC. When an incorrect voltage lev-
el is detected, an error message is gener-
ated, that can be used to activate a prop-
er self-healing (or recovery) mechanism to 
guarantee that the required level of ener-
gy is provided to the multisensor node. 
For example, the power supply can be auto-
matically switched to a small, rechargea-
ble battery, till repair, or replacement, 
of the faulty EHC. Our circuit is also 
self-checking with respect to its possible 
internal faults, thus providing an output 
error message also in case of faults af-
fecting itself during in field operation. 
The paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we describe the considered EHC. 
In Section 3, we analyze the effects of 
faults and parametric variations affecting 
the EHC components. In Section 4, we pro-
pose a low cost circuit to monitor concur-
rently the power supply voltage provided 
by the EHC. Section 5 reports some of the 
results of the  electrical simulations 
performed to verify the correct operation 
of our monitor. In Section 6, we verify 
the self checking ability of our circuit 
with respect to its possible internal 
faults, while in Section 7, we evaluate 
its costs. Finally, we give conclusive re-
marks in Section 8. 
2.  CASE STUDY: SELF-POWERED WEARABLE 
MULTISENSOR 
As a case study, we consider the wire-
less biomedical multisensor node described 
in [10]. The node features three different 
operating modes: i) the stand-by mode, in 
which it consumes approximately 3μW; ii) 
the data acquisition (DA) mode, in which a 
power consumption of less than 1mW is re-
ported;  iii) the radio transmission (TX) 
mode, during which the power consumption 
reaches a value of 10mW [10]. The node is 
in the DA mode most of the time, with 
short, periodic TX phases. 
The considered multisensor node is self-
powered by both an EHC exploiting human 
vibrations and a rechargeable battery. The 
sensor is normally powered by the EHC, 
whose produced power supply voltage is 
monitored by our monitoring circuit. When 
our monitor detects an incorrect voltage 
level, it triggers an error message that 
is employed to switch the sensor power 
supply to the rechargeable battery till 
repair, or replacement, of the faulty EHC. 
This self-healing technique allows to 
guarantee that the required power supply 
is provided to the sensor, despite incor-
rect voltage levels produced by the EHC 
due to faults affecting itself. 
The EHC is shown in Fig. 1. It employs a 
piezoelectric generator to convert the ki-
netic energy generated from human vibra-
tions into electrical energy [8]. Since 
the piezoelectric generator produces an AC 
voltage (Vpiezo), this needs to be rectified 
in order to be used for powering the mul-
tisensor node, here represented as an 
equivalent resistance Rload. Particularly, 
the AC voltage Vpiezo is first rectified to 
a DC voltage by a full-wave AC/DC rectifi-
er. Then the produced DC voltage is regu-
lated to the desired value by a step-down 
DC/DC converter (Fig. 1). 
The full-wave AC/DC rectifier consists 
of a diode bridge (D1-D4) and a storage 
capacitor (Cstor) that converts the AC volt-
age Vpiezo into the DC voltage V1, which is 
maintained at the terminals of Cstor. The 
AC/DC converter includes also an inductor 
L2 in series with a Synchronized Switch 
Harvesting on Inductor (SSHI) block [11], 
connected between the nodes Vin+ and Vin-. 
The SSHI block increases the voltage be-
tween nodes Vin+ and Vin-, thus reducing the 
energy loss across the four diodes of the 
AC/DC rectifier (D1-D4), and consequently 
increasing the overall efficiency of the 
EHC [11]. 
The DC voltage at V1 is regulated to a 
lower value (Vout) by the step-down DC/DC 
converter composed of a control circuit, a 
transistor M1, a capacitor Cout and an in-
Fig. 1. Considered EHC. 
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ductor L1 (Fig. 1). The Control Circuit 
generates a periodic control signal (VCS) 
that turns M1 on and off with a fixed fre-
quency fCS. This circuit compares the out-
put voltage Vout with a reference voltage 
(Vref) and, based on such comparison re-
sult, modifies the duty-cycle of signal 
VCS, in order to make Vout equal to Vref. A 
typical range of  fCS is 1kHz - tenths of 
kHz. As for Vout, it should be kept in the 
range [1.5V–2.1V] to guarantee the correct 
operation of the considered biomedical 
multisensor node [10, 12, 13]. 
The EHC in Fig. 1 has been implemented 
using the same 180nm standard CMOS tech-
nology as the considered multisensor node, 
and with discrete capacitors and induc-
tors. In particular, we have implemented 
all diodes (D1-D5) by MOS transistors with 
shorted drain – gate terminals, while we 
have considered Cstor=180μF, Cout=500μF and 
L1=22mH. Our implementation guarantees a 
nominal Vout value of 2.1V, independently of 
the power consumed by the multisensor 
node. 
As for the reference Vref, it has been 
obtained by means of a circuit of the kind 
in [14, 15], using a stable Zener diode 
with a breakdown voltage equal to 2.1V, 
which is the maximum value in the voltage 
range [1.5V - 2.1V] required for the sen-
sor correct operation. Therefore, since 
the minimum value in the required voltage 
range is 1.5V, there is a margin of 30% 
variation in the Zener diode breakdown 
voltage before Vref falls below 1.5V. As 
reported in [14, 15], stable Zener diodes 
guarantee a value of their breakdown volt-
age with 5%-10% variations with respect to 
the nominal value. This way, we can guar-
antee that Vref will never fall below 1.5V. 
Moreover, we included a clamping circuit 
of the kind in [16] in the EHC to  prevent 
Vout from rising above the maximal allowed 
value (2.1V). Therefore, an increase in 
the breakdown voltage of the Zener diode 
will not affect the EHC correct operation. 
3. FAULTS AFFECTING THE ENERGY HAR-
VESTING CIRCUIT AND THEIR EFFECTS 
For our analysis, we have assumed that 
the EHC is exhaustively tested after fab-
rication, thus fault-free at the beginning 
of its operation, and with its capacitor 
Cstor properly charged. We have considered 
faults affecting the EHC in Fig.1 during 
in field operation, and we have evaluated 
their impact on the provided Vout. For each 
EHC sub-circuit, we have also considered 
possible parameter variations affecting 
the transistors during fabrication, and 
the discrete components due to aging. 
 As for faults occurring in the field, 
for each sub-circuit we have considered 
all possible: i) node stuck-at 0 (SA0); 
ii) resistive bridgings (BFs), with real-
istic values of connecting resistance (RBF) 
in the range [0..6k] [17]; iii) transis-
tors stuck-on (SON); iv) transistors 
stuck-open (SOP). 
It is worth noticing that the tradition-
al node stuck-at 1 (SA1) fault model, in 
which the affected node is shortcircuited 
to the power supply, does not apply to the 
EHC internal nodes. This because our EHC 
generates itself the power supply voltage 
Vout and, as shown later, ideal shorts be-
tween EHC internal nodes and Vout modify 
considerably also the produced Vout volt-
age. Therefore, we have modeled SA1 faults 
affecting the internal nodes by a resis-
tive bridge to Vout, with a value of con-
necting resistance of 0 (i.e., a short 
circuit).  
For each sub-circuit of the EHC, we have 
considered also parametric variations up 
to: i) 30% in transistors widths, lengths, 
threshold voltages and thickness occurring 
during manufacturing; ii) 50% in the nomi-
nal values of the discrete capacitors and 
inductors due to aging.  
    In addition, we have assumed that 
faults/parameter variations occur one at a 
time in the field, and that the time 
elapsing between the occurrence of two 
following faults/parameter variations is 
longer  than the time interval between two 
following sensor transmissions. 
    In order to evaluate the fault effects 
on the provided Vout, we have performed 
electrical level simulations by means of 
HSPICE. The results of our analyses are 
reported in details in the following sub-
sections. 
3.1  Faults Affecting the AC/DC Rectifier and 
DC/DC Converter 
A. Stuck-At-0 (SA0) Affecting the AC/DC  
They may affect the following nodes: i) 
Vin+; ii) Vin-; iii) V1; iv) VS. 
We have verified that the SA0 of kind i) 
is activated during the positive half-
waves of Vpiezo (Fig. 1), independently of 
the EHC operating mode. When the SA0 is 
activated, the AC/DC rectifier fails in 
rectifying the positive Vpiezo half-waves, 
thus failing in charging Cstor (thus also 
Cout) to the expected value. Therefore, the 
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provided Vout is lower than the fault-free 
value. We have verified that, due to the 
rapid drop to ground of Vout, the correct 
operation of the EHC (whichever its oper-
ating mode) and of the multisensor node 
are compromised. 
As for the SA0 of kind ii), it is acti-
vated during the negative half-waves of 
Vpiezo, independently of the EHC operating 
mode. When this SA is activated, the AC/DC 
converter fails in rectifying the negative 
Vpiezo half-waves. Analogously to SA0 of 
kind i), Cstor and Cout are not charged to 
their expected values.  Therefore, the Vout  
value turns out to be lower than that pro-
vided under fault-free conditions, and is 
insufficient for the correct operation of 
the driven multisensor node, whichever the 
EHC operating mode. As a consequence, the 
correct operation of EHC and multisensor 
node are compromised. 
The SA0 of kind iii) is activated when 
|Vpiezo| > |VCstor|, for every EHC operating 
mode. The capacitor Cstor turns out to be 
not connected to the EHC, and the whole 
current produced by the piezoelectric gen-
erator flows to ground, being V1 SA0. Con-
sequently, the capacitor Cout is quickly 
discharged and the voltage Vout drops rap-
idly to ground. Therefore, the EHC and the 
multisensor node do not behave correclty.  
Finally, SA0s of kind iv) are activated 
when |VS|≠ 0, independently of the EHC op-
erating mode. When this SA is activated, 
the inductor L2 is constantly connected 
between Vin+ and ground, thus decreasing 
the amount of current flowing to Cstor 
through D1-D4. As a result, Cstor and Cout 
cannot be charged up to their expected 
values by the AC/DC and DC/DC, respective-
ly. As a consequence, Vout drops gradually 
to ground, compromising the correct opera-
tion of multisensor node. 
B. Stuck-At-0 (SA0) Affecting the DC/DC 
They may affect nodes: i) V2; ii) Vout; 
iii) VCS. 
The SA0 of kind i) is activated when VCS 
presents a high logic value (i.e., 
VCS=2.1V) and M1 is conductive. This SA0 
prevents the current coming from the AC/DC 
from flowing through the inductor L1. Con-
sequently, the capacitor Cout is quickly 
discharged and the voltage Vout drops rap-
idly to ground. As a consequence, the cor-
rect operation of both the EHC and  multi-
sensor node is compromised. Similar re-
sults have been obtained for SA0s of kind 
ii) and iii). 
C. Bridging Faults (BFs) Affecting the 
AC/DC 
We consider all possible BFs, with realistic 
values of connecting resistance (RBF) in the [0..6k] range 
[17]. Their activating conditions, as well 
as their produced effects during both the 
DA and TX operating modes are summarized 
in Table 1. 
Particularly, we have verified that, when 
activated,  each BF (except for the Vin
+ - 
VS and the V1 - Vout BFs discussed below) 
results in a gradual drop of the Vout volt-
age to ground, thus making it insufficient 
for the correct operation of the driven 
multisensor node. As an example, Fig. 2(a) 
reports the Vout behavior obtained consider-
ing a BF between Vin+ and GND, with a value 
of connecting resistance RBF = 1k and the 
multisensor node operating in the DA mode 
for t < t1, and in the TX mode for t  t1. 
As can be seen, after the multisensor en-
ters the TX mode at t1, the voltage Vout 
quickly drops to a value slightly higher 
than 1.5V, which is the minimum voltage 
value required by the multisensor node to 
operate correctly. Afterward, it continues 
to drop gradually to ground, reaching 1.5V 
soon after t1. 
TABLE 1 
EFFECTS OF BFS AFFECTING THE AC/DC CONVERTER BEHAVIOR. 
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As for the BF between Vin
+ - VS, it is ac-
tivated each time the SSHI switch is 
closed, thus making VS equal to Vin-. This 
BF, connecting a resistor in parallel to 
the inductor L2, reduces the current flow-
ing through L2. However, neither the volt-
age on Cstor, nor Vout are affected. 
Finally, the BF between V1 and Vout is ac-
tivated each time the voltage value on V1 
(i.e., the voltage across Cstor) differs 
from the voltage value on Vout (i.e., 
2.1V). This BF connects the positive ter-
minals of Cstor and Cout, thus originating a 
charge distribution process between them. 
As depicted in Fig. 2(b), this BF generates an 
initial voltage overshoot (for t < t2) on Vout, which reaches 
2.4V (a value higher than the maximum tolerated voltage of 
2.1V). Meanwhile, the voltage V1 across Cstor is reduced be-
cause of a decrease in the charge stored on Cstor. This makes 
the EHC fail in keeping Vout above 1.5V, when the multisen-
sor node switches from the DA to the TX mode at time t2. 
When following commutations of the multisensor node from 
the DA to the TX mode occur, Vout is further reduced, de-
creasing gradually to GND, thus compromising the correct 
operation of the multisensor node.  
From Fig. 2(b), we can also observe that 
Vout can exceed the maximum value (2.1V) 
allowed for the sensor correct operation. 
As previously clarified, in order to set 
such a maximum voltage to 2.1V, we includ-
ed in the EHC a low cost clamping circuit 
[16]. Such a circuit also avoids that pos-
sible sudden voltage bursts on Vout, in-
duced by capacitive or inductive coupling 
can exceed 2.1V. 
D. Bridging Faults (BFs) Affecting the 
DC/DC 
We consider BFs with values of connect-
ing resistance (RBF) in the range [0..6k] 
[17]. The activating conditions, as well 
as the produced effects during both DA and 
TX operating modes are reported in Table 
2. 
We can observe that the BF between V2 and 
ground affects Vout only during the TX 
mode, resulting in a gradual degradation 
to ground for all RBF in the considered 
range. As a consequence, the correct oper-
ation of the multisensor node may be com-
promised. Similar results have been ob-
tained for BFs between nodes VCS- Vout, VCS - 
GND, Vref – VCS, and VCS - V2, the latter for 
values of RBF in the range [4k..6k]. 
As for the BF between V1 and VCS, it 
makes M1 permanently ON. Therefore, this 
BF produces effects similar to the BF be-
tween V1 and Vout affecting the AC/DC (Sect. 
3.1C). As a result, the multisensor node 
correct operation is compromised. A simi-
lar behavior has been observed also for 
the BF between V1 and V2. 
   The BF between Vout and GND always af-
fects Vout (Table 2). Fig. 2(c) shows the 
effects on Vout after the occurrence of 
this BF at time t3, with RBF = 500. We can 
observe that Vout quickly drops to ground 
after t3, thus compromising the correct op-
eration of the multisensor node. A similar 
behaviors has been verified also for BFs 
between VCS and V2, for values of RBF in the 
range [0.. 4k]. 
    Finally, the BF between Vref and Vout 
is never activated, independently of the 
multisensor operating mode. In fact, dur-
ing the multisensor normal operation it is 
always Vref = Vout = 2.1 V. Therefore, this 
fault does not produce any effect on Vout. 
Moreover, we have verified that, if this 
fault is followed by any of the faults an-
alyzed before, the resulting effect on Vout 
is the same as that generated by such a 
following fault only (which has been pre-
Fig. 2. (a) V
out
 variation due to a BF (with R
BF 
= 1kΩ) between V
in
+ and GND. (b) Variation of Vout (solid line) and V1 (dashed line) in case of a 
BF (with RBF = 500Ω) between them. (c) Variation of Vout due to a BF (with RBF = 500Ω) between Vout and GND. 
(a) (b) (c) 
TABLE 2 
EFFECTS OF BFS AFFECTING THE DC/DC CONVERTER BEHAVIOR. 
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viously reported). A similar behavior has 
been observed also for the BF between 
nodes V2 and Vout.  
E. Transistor SONs / SOPs Affecting the 
AC/DC 
They may affect the transistors imple-
menting (Fig. 1): i) diodes D1, D4; ii) 
diodes D2, D3. 
As for SONs/SOPs of kind i), they are ac-
tivated when|Vpiezo|> |VCstor|, and they re-
duce the average current charging Cstor. As 
a result, a temporary voltage drop on Vout 
is produced  when the multisensor starts a 
transmission, thus compromising its cor-
rect operation. 
As for SONs/SOPs of kind ii), they are 
activated when |Vpiezo|<|VCstor|. We have ver-
ified that these SONs/SOPs produce the 
same effects as SONs/SOPs of kind i) 
above, causing a temporary voltage drop on 
Vout during the TX operating mode, thus 
compromising the correct operation of the 
multisensor node.  
F. Transistor SONs / SOPs Affecting the 
DC/DC 
    They may affect (Fig.1): i) M1; ii) 
D5. SON of kind i) is activated when 
VCS=0V. It connects permanently nodes V1 
and V2, and its effect on the output of the 
EHC is similar to that of a BF between V1 – 
Vout, whose effect is depicted in Fig. 
2(b). Therefore, a SON of kind i) produces 
an initial overshoot on Vout. Then, after 
successive commutations of the multisensor 
node from the DA to the TX operating mode, 
Vout starts a gradual drop to ground, com-
promising the multisensor node correct op-
eration. 
The SON of kind ii) is activated when 
VCS=0V. It gives rise to a permanent con-
ductive path from V2 to ground, thus pre-
venting Cout from charging. Consequently, 
Vout drops to ground after the next trans-
mission of the multisensor node, thus com-
promising its correct operation. 
As for the SOP of kind i), it is acti-
vated when VCS=2.1V, and induces operating 
conditions similar to the SA0 affecting 
node V2. In this case, the DC/DC is discon-
nected from the AC/DC, since M1 is always 
off. Consequently, Cout is quickly dis-
charged and the voltage Vout drops rapidly 
to ground, thus compromising the correct 
operation of the multisensor node. 
Finally, the SOP of kind ii) is activat-
ed when VCS=0V. Due to this SOP, D5 is al-
ways OFF, and after VCS flips to 0 switch-
ing off M1, no current flows through L1, 
as in the fault-free case. This prevents 
the DC/DC from charging Cout up to its ex-
pected voltage value. Therefore, Vout turns 
out to be lower than what expected under 
fault-free conditions, and it does not 
suffice for the correct operation of the 
multisensor node. 
3.2  Parametric variations Affecting the AC/DC 
Rectifier and the DC/DC Converter  
D. Parametric Variations Affecting the 
AC/DC  
We have considered: i) the diodes D1-D4; 
ii) the transistors composing the SSHI; 
iii) L2; iv) Cstor. 
Parametric variations of kind i), ii) 
and iii) do not affect the correct opera-
tion of the EHC, and Vout remains correctly 
fixed at 2.1V. In fact, as expected, the 
DC/DC tries to keep its output voltage 
equal to Vref, independently of the voltage 
value at its input. As discussed in the 
previous section, the Control Circuit of 
the DC/DC compares Vout with a reference 
voltage Vref and, based on the comparison 
result, it adjusts the duty-cycle of VCS in 
order to make Vout equal to Vref. Thus, para-
metric variations of kind i), ii) and iii) 
affecting the AC/DC are compensated by the 
DC/DC, so that they do not alter Vout. 
Parametric variations of kind iv) do not 
affect the correct operation of the EHC, 
as long as they are smaller than 35%. For 
higher values, the EHC fails in keeping 
Vout above 1.5V, when the multisensor node 
switches from the DA to the TX mode at 
time t1 (Fig. 3(a)), thus compromising the 
correct operation of the multisensor node.  
D. Parametric Variations Affecting the 
DC/DC Converter 
We have considered: i) the transistor 
M1; ii) the diode D5; iii) L1; iv) Cout. 
Parametric variations of kind i), ii), 
iii) and iv) never affect the correct op-
eration of the EHC. In fact, Vout may 
slightly vary when the sensor switches 
from the DA to the TX mode, but the EHC is 
able to keep Vout within the voltage inter-
val required for the sensor correct opera-
tion. As an example, Fig. 3(b) shows the 
Vout variation when the sensor switches 
from DA to TX mode at time t1, for -30% 
variations of the M1 channel width with 
respect to its nominal value. As can be 
seen, Vout  slightly decreases when the 
sensor enters the TX mode, but the minimum 
voltage reached is considerably higher 
than the minimum value (1.5V) required for 
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the sensor correct operation.  
As observed for the AC/DC, parametric 
variations on the components of the DC/DC 
do not modify the voltage Vout. In fact, 
the Control Circuit of the DC/DC adjusts 
the duty-cycle of signal VCS in order to 
counteract Vout variations. Therefore, par-
ametric variations of kind i), ii), iii) 
and iv) do not alter the Vout value.  
4.  PROPOSED ENERGY HARVESTING CONCURRENT 
MONITORING CIRCUIT 
We propose a circuit to monitor continu-
ously, and concurrently with the system 
operation, the correctness of the voltage 
Vout provided by the EHC. The proposed mon-
itor, whose electrical structure is based 
on the circuit that we introduced in [9], 
generates an error signal when Vout drops 
below 1.5V, or when it is affected by in-
ternal faults (as will be shown in Section 
6). In fact, since our monitor is employed 
for high reliability applications, it 
should be able to detect also faults af-
fecting itself. This is achieved by imple-
menting the monitor as a self-checking 
circuit employing two output signals as-
suming alternating logic values. If a sin-
gle output only had been considered, a 
simple output stuck-at fault at the fault-
free indication would have made the whole 
circuit useless.  
Our circuit is shown in Fig. 4. The pMOS 
M1 and the capacitor C1 generate an auxil-
iary voltage Vaux, which is used as power 
supply for our circuit. In fact, the pro-
posed monitor cannot use Vout as power sup-
ply, since it should provide an error in-
dication Vout drops below the required volt-
age value. Under fault free conditions, it 
is Vaux  Vout. Transistor M1 operates as a 
diode, allowing current to flow from Vout 
to Vaux, thus charging C1, when Vout > Vaux 
(i.e., when the circuit is turned on). 
Meanwhile, M1 prevents current from flow-
ing from Vaux to Vout when Vout < Vaux, due to 
a fault affecting the EHC, thus avoiding 
the discharge of C1. Therefore, when Vout 
drops, C1 allows to keep Vaux approximately 
constant for a chosen time interval, that 
is a function of the C1 value, thus allow-
ing the circuit to provide an error indi-
cation.  
It is worth noticing that, prior to 
fault occurrence, the voltage across C1 is 
maintained to the correct value by M1, 
which acts as a diode, in spite of leakage 
current affecting C1. In fact, if leakage 
current starts discharging C1, diode M1 
turns on and starts charging C1 up to the 
correct voltage value. 
Multiplexers MUX1 and MUX2 receive Vout 
and ground (GND) as inputs, and the system 
clock (CK) as control signal. When CK=0, 
it is OMUX = Vout and OMUX2 = 0, while when CK 
= 1, it is OMUX1 = 0 and OMUX2 = Vout. Each 
multiplexer has been implemented using two 
transfer gates (TGs). They are driven by 
CK and its complement (CK’), which are 
properly synchronized. 
    As for INV11 and INV21, they are pMOS 
dominant, and designed to have a nominal 
logic threshold voltage (denoted as VLT-PD) 
equal to the 72% of their power supply 
voltage (Vaux). Finally, INV12 and INV22 
are minimum sized and symmetric inverters, 
employed to reshape the signals on nodes 
I1 and I2. 
    In the fault-free case, Vout is ap-
proximately equal to Vaux. When CK=0, it is 
OMUX1 = Vout ( Vaux), thus INV11 produces a 
low logic value (I1=0). Instead, INV21 
produces a high logic value (I2=1), since 
it is OMUX2=0. Therefore, when CK=0, it is 
(Err1, Err2) = (1, 0). Analogously, when 
CK=1, it is (Err1, Err2) = (0, 1). Therefore, 
under fault-free conditions, the outputs 
of our monitor present always alternating 
and complementary logic values (Err1, Err2) = 
(1, 0) or (0, 1)), as required for its re-
liable operation. 
Let us consider the case of a fault af-
fecting EHC, and making Vout drop below 
1.5V. Let us refer to this value as Voutmin. 
In this case, it is Vout <0.72Vaux, with Vaux 
maintained equal to 2.1V by C1. Since Vaux 
acts as power supply for INV11 and INV21, 
it is Voutmin=VLT-PD = 1.5V, where VLT-PD is the 
logic threshold voltage of the two invert-
ers.  
Fig. 4. Proposed monitoring circuit. 
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When CK=0, it is OMUX1=Vout  < Voutmin = VLT-
PD. Consequently, INV11 gives a high logic 
value as output (I1=1). On the other hand, 
it is OMUX2=0, so that also INV21 produces a 
high logic value (I2=1). Thus, when CK=0, 
it is (Err1, Err2) = (0, 0). 
When CK=1, it is OMUX1=0, thus INV11 pro-
duces a high logic value (I1=1). Mean-
while, it is OMUX2 = Vout < Voutmin = VLT-PD, so 
that I2=1. Therefore, also when CK=1, it 
is (Err1, Err2) = (0, 0).  
Therefore, when Vout drops below 1.5V, 
our monitor gives equal values on Err1 and 
Err2 during the whole CK cycle. We consider 
(Err1, Err2) = (0, 0) or (1, 1) as indica-
tions of either faults affecting EHC or, 
as shown in Section 6, faults affecting 
our monitor itself. 
5. IMPLEMENTATION AND VERIFICATION 
We have implemented our monitor consider-
ing a standard 180nm CMOS technology. The 
proposed scheme is reported in Fig. 4, 
where also the n,pMOS transitor shape fac-
tors (Sn, Sp) are reported. The value of C1 
is high enough to allow our monitor to 
work correctcly for many seconds after Vout 
goes below 1.5V, thus allowing the activa-
tion of proper recovery actions. We have 
analyzed the behavior of our monitor by 
conventional and Monte Carlo electrical 
simulations, considering 20% statistical 
variations, with uniform distribution, of 
oxide thickness, transistor threshold 
voltage and electron/hole mobility. 
Fig. 5(a) reports the simulation results 
obtained under nominal values of electri-
cal parameters in case of faults making  
Vout  temporary lower than Voutmin = 1.5V. We 
can observe that, during the time interval 
in which Vout is lower than Voutmin, it is 
(Err1, Err2) = (0, 0), thus indicating the 
presence of an incorrect voltage value on 
Vout.  
Fig. 5(b) shows the Monte Carlo simula-
tions results. As can be seen, Voutmin varies 
between 1.55V and 1.3V. Therefore, parame-
ter variations can make our monitor gener-
ate: i) false error indications (if Voutmin > 
1.5V); ii) false indications of correct 
operation (if Voutmin < 1.5V). In order to 
avoid these conditions, the logic thresh-
olds of the inverters of our monitor 
should be programmable after fabrication, 
for instance by adopting the approach in 
[19]. This would imply an extra cost in 
area which, however, has a negligible im-
pact the EHC area, as shown in Section 7. 
6. SELF-CHECKING ABILITY  
Our monitor may be affected by faults 
itself. To guarantee system high reliabil-
ity, similarly to checkers of self-
checking circuits (SCCs) [18], our monitor 
should check itself with respect to inter-
nal faults, and satisfy either the Totally 
Self-Checking (TSC) [18], or the Strongly 
Code-Disjoint (SCD) [20] property with re-
spect to such faults. As usual with SCCs, 
we assume that faults occur one at a time, 
and that the time elapsing between two 
following faults is long enough to allow 
the application of all possible input 
codewords (i.e., the correct Vout value) 
[18].  
We have considered a set of faults F 
possibly affecting our monitor composed by 
node stuck-ats (SAs), transistor stuck-
opens (SOPs), transistor stuck-ons (SONs) 
and resistive bridgings (BFs), with values 
of connecting resistance R in the range 
[0..6k] [17]. We have analyzed their ef-
fects by means of logical and electrical 
simulations. The achieved results are sum-
marized below.  
 
Fig. 3. (a) Vout in case of 50% variation in Cstor. (b) Vout in case of -
30% variation in the M1 channel width. 
(a) (b) 
Fig. 5. (a) Results with nominal values of electrical parameters and 
temporary drop of Vout. (b) Monte-Carlo simulations showing the min-
imum voltage value on Vout resulting in an error indication.  
(a) (b) 
TABLE 3 
ACTIVATING CONDITIONS FOR SAS  AFFECTING OUR MONITOR. 
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6.1 Stuck-At Faults (SAs)  
They may affect: i) OMUX1, OMUX2; ii) I1, 
I2; iii) Err1, Err2; iv) CK, CK’; v) Vaux. The 
activating conditions of the considered 
SAs 1/0 are summarized in Table 3. 
As for SAs of kind i), we have verified 
that, when they are activated, an error 
indication is produced during one of the 
CK semi-periods, so that our circuit is 
TSC with respect to them. Analogous con-
siderations hold true for SAs of kind ii), 
iii) and iv). 
A SA0 affecting Vaux is activated immedi-
ately after its occurrence and results in 
the generation of an error message (Err1, 
Err2) = (0, 0). Our circuit is therefore 
TSC with respect to such a fault. 
Instead, a SA1 on Vaux is never activat-
ed, thus not resulting in the generation 
of any error message. Moreover, our cir-
cuit is not able to indicate an incorrect 
voltage value on Vout. Therefore, our cir-
cuit is neither TSC, nor SCD with respect 
to it. The occurrence of such a fault 
should be avoided by properly designing 
the circuit layout [21].  
 
6.2 Transistor Stuck-Open Faults (SOPs)  
They  may affect: i) MUX1 and MUX2; ii) 
INV11, INV12, INV21 and INV22; iii) M1. As 
for SOPs of kind i), they may affect: i-a) 
the pMOS or nMOS of TG2 and TG3, or the 
nMOS of TG1 and TG4; i-b) the pMOS of TG1 
and TG4. The activating conditions of the 
considered SOPs are summarized in Table 4. 
When activated, SOPs of kind i-a) do not 
result in the generation of any error mes-
sage. However, our circuit continues to 
detect incorrect Vout values. Moreover, if 
such SOPs are followed by other faults in 
F, our circuit continues to work properly 
and produces an error message after the 
following fault activation. Therefore, our 
circuit is SCD with respect to SOPs of 
kind i-a). 
In case of SOPs of kind i-b), the cor-
rect operation of our monitor is not modi-
fied before their activation. Instead, 
their activation results in the generation 
of an error message, so that our circuit 
is TSC with respect to them. Similar con-
siderations apply to SOPs of kind ii) and 
iii). 
 
6.3 Transistor Stuck-On Faults (SONs) 
They may affect: i) the transistors of 
MUX1, MUX2; ii) the pMOS of INV11 and 
INV21; iii) the nMOS of INV11 and INV21; 
iv) the nMOS and pMOS of INV12 and INV22; 
v) transistor M1. As for SONs of kind i), 
they may affect transistors of: i-a) TG1 
or TG4; i-b) TG2 or TG3. The activating 
conditions of the considered SONs are sum-
marized in Table 5. 
SONs of kind i-a), when activated, do 
not result in the generation of an error 
message. Our circuit continues to detect 
incorrect Vout values and, if SONs of this 
kind are followed by other faults in F, it 
correctly produces an error message when 
the following fault is activated. There-
fore, our circuit is SCD with respect to 
SONs of kind i-a). 
In case of SONs of kind i-b), when they 
are activated, an error indication is pro-
duced during one of the CK semi-periods. 
Therefore, our circuit is TSC with respect 
to them. Similarly, as for SONs of kind 
ii).  
SONs of kind iii) do not give rise to 
the generation of any error message when 
activated. However, they do not affect the 
correct behavior of our monitoring cir-
cuit. If another fault in F occurs, our 
circuit continues to detect incorrect Vout 
values before the the fault is activated, 
while it produces an error message after 
its activation. Therefore, our circuit is 
SCD with respect to SONs of kind iii). 
As for SONs of kind iv), when activated, 
they result in the generation of an inter-
mediate voltage value on Err1 or Err2 during 
one of the CK semi-periods. Depending on 
the logic threshold of the downstream log-
ic, an error indication may be generated. 
Instead, if no error message is gener-
atied, our circuit continues to work 
properly. Moreover, if other faults in F 
follow these SONs, our circuit keeps on 
working correctly, producing an error mes-
sage after the following fault is activat-
ed. Therefore, our circuit is TSC or SCD 
with respect to this kind of SONs.  
Finally, as for a SON of kind v), it 
produces the same effect as the SA1 af-
fecting node Vaux, so that the same consid-
erations apply. 
 
6.4 Bridging Faults (BFs) 
TABLE 4 
ACTIVATING CONDITIONS FOR SOPS AFFECTING OUR MONITOR. 
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All possible BFs affecting our monitor 
have been considered (Fig. 6(a)). The max-
imum resistance value for which each BF 
results in an error message is reported in 
Fig. 6(b), along with the activating con-
ditions. When BFs with Rmax=6kΩ are acti-
vated, an error indication is produced dur-
ing one of the CK semi-periods, so that 
our circuit is TSC with respect to them. 
Instead, BFs RB1, RB3 and RB10 result in an 
error message for values of R lower than 
3.6k, 5.1 k and 0.6k, respectively. For 
higher values of R, our circuit continues 
to detect incorrect Vout values. If such 
BFs are followed by other faults in F, our 
circuit continues to work properly before 
the following fault is activated, and when 
this occurs it produces an error message. 
Therefore, our circuit is SCD with respect 
to them. 
As for RB4, RB6, and RB13, they are never 
activated, thus they do not result in an 
error indication. Due to these BFs, our 
circuit is no longer able to detect incor-
rect Vout values. Therefore, the occurrence 
of such faults should be avoided by 
properly designing the circuit layout 
[21].  
7. COST EVALUATION  
We have evaluated the power consumption 
and area overhead of our monitor. We have 
implemented it as described in Section 5, 
with programmable inverters designed as 
described in [19]. We have compared the 
area and power required by our monitor to 
those of the considered EHC, implemented 
as described in Section 2. 
Table 6 shows how the power consumed by 
our monitor (Pmon) and by EHC (PEHC) increase 
with their respective operating frequen-
cies (i.e., the frequency of CK signal, 
and the frequency fCS of the EHV control 
signal VCS). As can be seen, Pmon is consid-
erably lower than PEHC for all considered, 
realistic frequencies. Table 6 reports al-
so Pmon relative increase over PEHC. As can 
be seen, such an increase is negligible 
for all considered frequencies. 
According to the implementation in Sec-
tion 5, our monitor requires an area of 
500 squares (16μm2) for the 41 transistors 
(Fig 7). Since the AC/DC and DC/DC con-
verters of EHC (Fig. 1) require 5920 
squares (189μm2), we can conclude that the 
area increase required by our monitor is 
approximately 8.5%.  
As for C1 (Fig 7), due to its relatively 
large capacitance value (C1 = 10μF), it 
may be implemented as a discrete compo-
nent, together with other discrete capaci-
tors, Cstor and Cout, and inductors, (L1 and 
L2), of the EHC. Since the two capacitors 
of the EHC are considerably larger than C1 
(Cstor=180μF and Cout=500μF), the implementa-
tion of C1 negligibly impacts the EHC ar-
ea. Therefore, we can conclude that our 
proposed monitor induces a very small area 
increase in the total area of the consid-
ered EHC. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
We have addressed the concurrent detec-
tion of faults possibly affecting an EHC 
powering a wearable biomedical sensor. We 
have analyzed the effects of possible 
faults and parametric variations affecting 
the components of the EHC, showing that 
they may make it fail in producing the 
supply voltage level required by the sen-
sor.   
We have then proposed a novel low cost 
circuit to monitor continuously, and con-
currently with normal operation, the power 
supply voltage produced by the EHC. Our 
circuit gives an error indication if the 
provided supply voltage falls below the 
minimum value required by the sensor to 
work correctly, thus allowing the activa-
tion of proper recovery actions. 
Our monitor requires very low costs in 
terms of power consumption and area over-
head. Moreover, it features self-checking 
ability with respect to its possible in-
ternal faults, but for a few faults, whose 
likelihood can be reduced by means of 
proper layout design.  
TABLE 5 
ACTIVATING CONDITIONS FOR SONS AFFECTING OUR MONITOR. 
TABLE 6 
POWER CONSUMED BY OUR MONITOR (PMON) AND BY EHC (PEHC) 
AND RELATIVE POWER CONSUMPTION INCREASE.  
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